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MINNESOTA'S HIP-POCKET REGIME
I. INTRODUCTION
A distinctive feature of Minnesota civil procedure is the mode
of commencing an action. In the vast majority of U.S. states, a civil
action is commenced by filing documents with a court. This is not
the case in Minnesota. Per a largely foregone legal tradition dating
back to the early days of U.S. civil procedure, a party in Minnesota
commences an action by serving a summons upon the
defendant(s) 2 No filing need be made. This practice is
affectionately termed "hip-pocket service," and it comes with its
share of benefits and drawbacks.3
In 2009, the Minnesota Supreme Court undertook reform of
the civil justice system with an eye toward efficiency and cost-
control.4 This occurred in the broader context of a national
movement addressing widely acknowledged deficiencies in state
court systems. 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court convened a Civil
Justice Reform Task Force, which proposed (among other things) a
number of amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure. 6
Among the amendments approved by the court, and ultimately
put into effect, is one conditioning Minnesota's distinctive hip-
pocket system.7 Prior to this amendment, there was no requirement
that a civil action be filed with a court within any set period of
time." Parties could bring suit, conduct formal discovery for years,
and eventually settle without ever actually involving the court
system. Under the amended Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
5.04, however, a party must file an action within one year of
commencing it.' Failure to file within one year triggers automatic
involuntary dismissal of the action, unless the involved parties sign a
stipulation extending the deadline.'"
This consequence for failing to file is undeniably harsh,
especially in light of the fact that the filing requirement applied to
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Parts II-III.
3. See infra Parts II-III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part VIII.A.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part V.
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actions pending as of the date the amendment took effect.''
Attorneys not apprised of the new requirement could easily find
themselves with a stale case and an unhappy client." The specter of
automatic involuntary dismissal raises a number of concerns, which
this Note addresses in depth. 3 What about the usual substantive
prerequisites for involuntary dismissal? What is the procedure for
appealing such a dismissal? Can a party seek relief under rule 60.02
or 86.01 (b) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure? Finally, is it
constitutionally questionable to strip away a party's cause of action
so hastily and irrevocably?
Setting aside the issue of automatic involuntary dismissal, this
Note moves to a discussion of the national civil justice reform
movement at large. 14 It then focuses on New York for a case study
on what it means to transition from commencement-by-service to
commencement-by-filing. 15 This Note concludes by returning to
Minnesota's new one-year filing requirement to evaluate its
propriety going forward. 16
II. COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION IN MINNESOTA
In Minnesota, a civil action is commenced in one of three
ways: (a) by serving a summons directly upon the defendant, (b) by
serving a summons through the mail and receiving an
acknowledgement from the defendant, or (c) by delivering a
summons to the sheriff in the county where each defendant resides
(provided that the sheriff then serves the summons within sixty
days).17
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VII.A.
13. See infra Part VII.
14. See infra Part VIII.A.
15. See infra Part VIII.B.
16. See infra Part VIII.C.
17. MINN. R. CIv. P. 3.01. If a plaintiff elects to serve process by mail, the date
of commencement against a defendant is the date at which that defendant
acknowledges service. Id. "If no acknowledgement is signed and returned, the
action is not commenced until service is effected by some other authorized
means." Id. advisory committee's note (1985 amendment). Counterintuitively, if a
plaintiff delivers process to a sheriff, the action is commenced upon delivery to the
sheriff (not upon delivery to the defendant). Prior to 1985, Rule 3.01 vaguely
provided that commencement could be accomplished by delivery to any "proper
official." The 1985 amendment specified that it had to be a sheriff, thus dispelling
any confusion as to what constituted a "proper official." 1 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER
1558 [Vol. 41:4
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Remarkably, none of these alternatives involves actually filing
suit with the court. That is to say, a lawsuit becomes real without
regard to whether the State has any notice of its existence.'S The
applicable statute of limitations is tolled, 9 and the defendant must
20
serve an answer within twenty days.
This is anomalous. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that an action is commenced by, and only by, filing a
complaint with the court.2' Only then may the plaintiff serve
22
process. The summons will bear the court's seal and be signed by
a court clerk.23
The vast majority of states mirror this procedure. In forty-one
states, filing necessaril y precedes service and is the only way to
commence an action. Six states permit service prior to filing as
25
long as the suit is filed shortly thereafter. In Colorado, an action
may be commenced by filing or by serving a summons and
S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED § 3.3 (5th ed.
2009).
18. 1 HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 17 ("[T] he summons can be served, and
returned to the plaintiff, and the court never advised of the action. In fact, many
civil actions in Minnesota are resolved without filing any papers with the court.").
19. See, e.g., Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066,
1068 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[T]his action was commenced for statute of limitations
purposes on March 17, 2003, when Enervations served the complaint on 3M.").
20. MINN. R. CIv. P. 12.01. But see 1 HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 17, § 12.3
("Rule 12 permits a party to serve certain motions in the place of an answer or
other responsive pleading. If a party serves a proper Rule 12 motion within the 20
day time period permitted for a responsive pleading, the time for filing a
responsive pleading is automatically extended until the hearing and decision on
the Rule 12 motion.").
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 3. The rule is concise: "A civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court." Id.
22. Id. R. 4(b). Per subsection (m) of this same rule, the plaintiff has 120
days after filing a complaint to serve the relevant defendants. Id. R. 4(m).
23. Id. R. 4(a)(1) ("If the summons is properly completed, the clerk must
sign, seal, and issue it to the plaintiff for service on the defendant."); Id. R. 4(b).
24. Sam Glover, Has the Flood of Debt Collection Lawsuits Swept Away
Minnesotans' Due Process Rights?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1115, 1118-19 (2009)
(explaining how debt collectors unscrupulously mobilize the hip-pocket system to
their advantage); e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.02(1)-(4) (West, Westlaw through
2015 Act 3).
25. These states are Colorado, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Utah,
Vermont, and Washington. The period after service within which the suit must be
filed ranges from ten to ninety days. Glover, supra note 24, at 1119.
155920151
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complaint, as long as the complaint is filed within fourteen days of
service .26
Minnesota is an outlier. In three states and three states only-
Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota-it is possible to
commence an action, conduct lengthy discovery, and reach a
settlement without ever filing.27 The parties thus circumvent court
filing fees altogether and consume precisely zero judicial
28resources.
The act of serving a summons and complaint without filing is
referred to as "hip-pocket service" or "pocket service. ' , 29 District
Court Judge Joan N. Ericksen explains the term: "This is
colloquially referred to as 'pocket service' because a plaintiff may
serve one or more defendants and keep the complaint 'in his
pocket' rather than making a public filing.""
III. HISTORY OF THE HIP-POCKET QUIRK
Commencement-by-service is a practice traceable back into
Minnesota's days as a territory. Chapter 70, section 44 of the
Minnesota Territorial Statutes of 1851 provided, "Civil actions in
the several district courts of this territory, must be commenced
by the service of a summons .... ,,31 In fact, many of the finer
26. COLO. R. CIrv. P. 3(a). Subject to the court's discretion and to waiver by
the defendant, failure to file within fourteen days renders service "ineffective and
void.." Id.
27. Glover, supra note 24, at 1120 ("Minnesota and the Dakotas are an
extreme minority. In nearly every other state, a defendant has a legitimate
expectation that a lawsuit not filed is not real."); see N.D. R. Civ. P. 3; see also S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 15-2-30 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess., 2014 general
election results, and Supreme Court Rule 14-10).
28. As of October 31, 2014, it cost $324 to file a civil action in Hennepin
County and $327 in Ramsey County. In both counties it is an additional $102 to
demand a jury. Fees, MINN.JUD. BRANCH, https://www.courts.state.mn.us/fees (last
visited Apr. 23, 2015).
29. Harris v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-669 (JNE/AJB), 2012 WL
1948775, at *1 (D. Minn. May 30, 2012); Glover, supra note 24, at 1119 n.18.
30. Harris, 2012 WL 1948775, at *1. In this case, the plaintiff had
commenced an action against certain large banks. Id. The case was filed and the
plaintiff subsequently served an amended complaint on the defendants. Id. The
proposed amendment was disregarded because the plaintiff failed to file her
amended complaint within a reasonable time after service. Id. The court held that
hip-pocket methods are unavailable as to an amended complaint when the case
already has a docket number. Id.
31. MINN. TERRITORIAL STAT. ch. 70, § 44 (1851), available at https://www
1560 [Vol. 41:4
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procedural details remain essentially unchanged. For example,
service could be accomplished through the mail or by delivering
process to the county sheriff:
2
This practice is further traceable back to the New York Field
Code of 1848-the major forerunner of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the successor to the "arcane and technical common
law pleading" which had its roots in EnglandY. Following its
codification in New York, the Field Code was adopted by34'.
approximately thirty other states, including Minnesota." Under
the Field Code, commencement of the action was accomplished by
36
service of a summons-no filing was necessary.
Although declining to adopt this practice, the Federal Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure discussed its benefits in
the Committee's April 1937 Report to the United States Supreme
Court:
Several members of the Committee prefer the system in
force in New York, Minnesota, South Dakota, Washington,
and a number of other code states. Under that system an
action is commenced by the service of summons .... No
papers need be filed with the court .... The advantages
of that system are that it avoids early publicity, avoids the
.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/?id=70&year= 1851.
32. Id. ch. 70, §§ 48, 52.
33. William Nelson, Remarks: The History of New York Civil Procedure, 16 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 659, 661 (2013) ("It was [the] separation of substance from
procedure that made it possible for David Dudley Field to propose his mid-
nineteenth-century procedural reforms that replaced arcane and technical
common law pleading-pleading that no one really wanted-with much simpler
pleading of facts. Field was merely codifying a powerful idea that most likely had
already transformed legal practice.").
34. Id. at 659 (remarking that "the Field Code had much greater national
influence than the [New York Civil Practice Law and Rules] has had").
35. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRIcT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, at 5 (1937),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports
/CV04-1937.pdf (referring to Minnesota as a "code state").
36. One incarnation of this rule is section 582 of New York's 1850 Code of
Civil Procedure: "An action is commenced as to each defendant when the
summons is served on him, or on a co-defendant, who is a joint contractor, or
otherwise united in interest, with him." N.Y. CODE CIV. P. § 582 (1850), available at
htps://archive.org/stream/codecivitprocedOOfielgoog#page/n335/mode/
2up.
Unfortunately, the text of the original 1848 Field Code is vexatiously difficult to
track down.
156120151
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accumulations in the clerk's office of a vast number of
actions which are eventually settled or abandoned, lessens
the fees paid by litigants in actions which do not reach
the stage where court action becomes necessary,
and ... reduces the necessity of travelling great distances
to file papers .... Probably the novelty of such a practice
among many members of the bar is, at the present time,
the only serious obstacle to its adoption."
Despite these purported benefits, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure rejected hip-pocket service in favor of commencement-
by-filing.38 Rule 3 is succinct and has remained substantively
unchanged since its adoption: "A civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court.,
39
The Federal Rules became effective on September 16, 1938.'o
Since this date, twenty to thirty states have adopted the Federal
Rules or a slight variation thereof Consistent with the assimilation
of the Federal Rules, the vast majority of states abandoned hip-
pocket service and adopted commencement-by-filing. As stated
earlier, only three states retain this vestige of the past-Minnesota
and the Dakotas.42
Incidentally, Minnesota's Rules of Procedure for the District
Courts are otherwise "a replica of the FRCP [Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] ."4 The hip-pocket quirk is an important exception to
Minnesota's assimilation of the Federal Rules. In 1986, the
Washington Law Review dubbed it "one of the nation's most
progressive systems of code pleading."
4
37. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 35, at 5-6.
The reader will note that this text evidences an era when hip-pocket service was
alive in more than three states. See id. at 5.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
39. Id.
40. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1004 (3d ed. 2014).
41. Nelson, supra note 33, at 660. This considerable range is due to the
malleability of the term "adopted." Id.
42. Glover, supra note 24, at 1119.
43. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1404 (1986).
44. Id.
1562 [Vol. 41:4
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IV. HISTORY OF THE 2013 AMENDMENTS
In fall 2009, the Minnesota Supreme Court established a Civil
Justice Forum. 45 Its task was to propose changes that would facilitate
"more cost effective and efficient civil case processing. "" The
Forum produced a list of initial proposals and recommended that a
47
task force be convened to more thoroughly investigate the matter.
Chief Justice Lorie Gildea established such a body in
November 2010. 48 The Minnesota Supreme Court Civil Justice
Reform Task Force consisted of members drawn from the bar, the
business world, the public sector, academia, and so on."' Its official
charge was to consider both the Forum's report and initiatives
undertaken in other jurisdictions, and to develop
recommendations of its own aimed at cost effectiveness and
efficiency.5
The objectives of cost effectiveness and efficiency arose out of9 51
concern that too many cases were being resolved out of court.
The Task Force worried that delay and expense had rendered the
civil justice system a less-than-viable forum for resolving disputes. 52
Cases would too often settle, and settlements would be based on
45. MINN. SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK
FORCE: FINAL 6 (2011) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www
.m ncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/CourtInformationOffice/CivilJusticeRef
_TaskForce_Dec_2011_Rpt.pdf. The Forum was "modeled after a successful
effort on criminal justice reform." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Order Establishing Civil Justice Reform Task Force, ADMIO-8051 (Minn.
Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://minnlawyer.com/wp-files/supremecourt-full
text_12061 0/civil-reform-task-force-appt-order-101 124-2.html.
49. Louise Dovre Bjorkman & David F. Herr, Reducing Cost & Delay:
Minnesota Courts Revise Civil Case Handling, BENCH & B. MINN., May/June 2013, at
26, 27 ("In addition to the diversity of practice settings, Task Force members
hailed from all corners of Minnesota and represented a wide variety of
constituents, including MSBA, Minnesota Association for Justice, Minnesota
Defense Lawyers Association, American Board of Trial Counsel, Legal Aid, and city
and county attorneys."). A complete list of appointed members may be found at
Order Establishing CivilJustice Reform Task Force, supra note 48.
50. Order Establishing Civil Justice Reform Task Force, supra note 48.
51. Bjorkman & Herr, supra note 49, at 27.
52. Id. ("[C]ases settle not based on their merits but due to the cost of the
litigation. Discovery, in particular, has become a war of attrition.").
15632015]
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the resources and patience of the parties rather than the merits.
As stated in the Task Force's final report to the Minnesota Supreme
Court, "Our courts must remain relevant to Minnesota litigants by
providing a forum for just, prompt, and inexpensive resolution of
civil disputes.' 54
The Task Force filed its final report with the Office of
Appellate Courts on December 27, 2011."' The report details a slew
of proposed actions, ranging from amendments to Minnesota's
Rules of Civil Procedure, to the institution of an expedited case-
processing program, and to the development of an educational
program designed forjudges and litigants alike.56
Informed by these recommendations, the Minnesota Supreme
Court issued an initial order adopting amendments to the Rules of
Civil Procedure and General Rules of Practice on February 4,
2013. These amendments took their final form in another court
order, dated May 8, 2013.5s This order provided that the
amendments would be effective as of July 1, 2013, and that (with
53. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 11 ("High litigation costs cause
parties to forgo claims that do not exceed the litigation expenses. The most
commonly cited monetary threshold for pursuing a case is $100,000. Some task
force members feel that the local threshold may be closer to $200,000. The surveys
and studies also present evidence of agreement that litigation costs also drive cases
to settle for reasons unrelated to the substantive merits of the claims or
defenses.").
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 1.
56. Id. at 17-35. Arguably the most momentous proposed change to
Minnesota's Rules of Civil Procedure was the adoption of an all-encompassing
"proportionality consideration requirement" for discovery. Id. at 17. This change
was ultimately implemented by way of an amendment to Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 1, and will undoubtedly provide great fodder for future law review
notes. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 1.
57. Order Adopting Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and
General Rules of Practice Relating to the CivilJustice Reform Task Force, ADM10-
8051, ADM09-8009, ADM04-8001 (Minn. Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://www
.mncourts.gov/Documen ts/O/Public/ClerksOffice/Rule% 20Amendme n ts/2013
-02-04%200rder%2OCiv%20Proc%20&%2OGen %20Rls%20Amendments.pdf.
58. Order Relating to the Civil Justice Reform Task Force, Authorizing
Expedited Civil Litigation Track Pilot Project, and Adopting Amendments to the
Rules of Civil Procedure and the General Rules of Practice, ADM10-8051,
ADM09-8009, ADM04-8001 (Minn. May 8, 2013) [hereinafter Final Order],
available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/O/Public/Clerks-Office/Rule
%20Amendments/ORADM108051-050813.pdf.
[Vol. 41:41564
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conditions) they would ap ly to pending cases as well as cases
commenced after this date.
5T
V. THE ONE-YEAR FILING REQUIREMENT
With these amendments, a small but consequential paragraph
was added to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5.04:
Any action that is not filed with the court within one year
of commencement against any party is deemed dismissed
with prejudice against all parties unless the parties within
that year sign a stipulation to extend the filing period.
This paragraph does not apply to family cases governed
by rules 301 to 378 of the General Rules of Practice for
the District Courts.6
Both the amended and pre-amendment versions of Rule 5.04
provide that "All documents after the complaint required to be
served upon a party, together with a certificate of service, shall
be filed with the court within a reasonable time after
service . .. [listing exceptions].,,6 However, there was nothing in
the pre-amendment version of Rule 5.04 explicitly requiring the
action to be filed within any period of time.
In fact, Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(a) was the
only rule addressing this, and it was in the context of a failure to
prosecute: "The court may upon its own initiative, or upon motion
of a party, and upon such notice as it may prescribe, dismiss an
action or claim for failure to prosecute or to comply with these
59. Id. at 3.
These amendments apply to all actions or proceedings pending on or
commenced after the effective date provided that: (a) no action shall
be involuntarily dismissed pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04 until one
year after the effective date; and (b) amendments to Minn. R. Civ. P.
26 apply only to actions commenced on or after the effective date
provided that the court may in any case direct the parties to comply
with all or part of the rule as part of a pretrial order.
Id.
60. MINN. R. CIrv. P. 5.04; Final Order, supra note 58, at 14.
61. MINN. R. Civ. P. 5.04 (emphasis added). Exceptions include "disclosures
under Rule 26, expert disclosures and reports, depositions upon oral examination
and interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers
and responses thereto ...." Id. These documents need not be filed unless the
court orders such, or a party wishes to use the document in a proceeding. Id.
62. See Final Order, supra note 58, at 14 (underlining the added language).
20151 1565
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rules or any order of the court.' ,63 Short of an outright failure to
prosecute, there was no rule imposing a time limit for filing after
commencement.
Thus, the amendment introduced something entirely new:
irrespective of its merits, a case would be automatically deemed
dismissed with prejudice if not filed within one year (granted, the
parties can stipulate otherwise). Although this amendment applied
to cases pending as of the effective date (July 1, 2013), the
Minnesota Supreme Court provided that no case would be
involuntarily dismissed under the new rule until a full year after
this date. ' Therefore, cases pending as of July 1, 2013, would be
involuntarily dismissed on July 1, 2014 if not yet filed.
VI. AN ANALOGY: COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
Involuntary dismissal by rule may seem unprecedented and
drastic, but it bears at least a passing resemblance to the sort of
estoppel resulting from failure to assert a proper counterclaim
pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 13.01.65 If, during
the course of litigation, a party fails to bring a claim that she or he
has against any opposing party, and the claim arises out of the same
transaction that is the subject matter of the existing litigation, this
party is estopped from bringing this claim in a later suit.66
Notably-because the language of the rule is "transaction," and not
"transaction or occurrence"-this does not apply to tort claims.67
Granted, the new Rule 5.04 does not operate in terms of
estoppel, but claim preclusion under Rule 13.01 may be one of the
63. MINN. R. Civ. P.41.02(a).
64. See Final Order, supra note 58, at 3.
65. MINN. R. Civ. P. 13.01. The author would like to thank Mr. Herr for
sharing this analogy. Interview with David F. Herr, Of Counsel, Maslon Edelman
Borman & Brand, LLP, Member, Minn. Supreme Court Civil Justice Reform Task
Force, in St. Paul, Minn. (Oct. 17, 2014) (audio recording and partial transcript
on file with author and available by request).
66. House v. Hanson, 245 Minn. 466, 470, 72 N.W.2d 874, 877 (1955) ("We
are ... confronted with a bar created by rule, Rule 13.01, which logically is in the
nature of an estoppel arising from the culpable conduct of a litigant in failing to
assert a proper counterclaim.").
67. Id. at 472-73, 72 N.W.2d at 878 ("[T]he word 'transaction' as used in
Rule 13.01 does not embrace claims in tort and that therefore the failure of a
defendant to assert as a counterclaim any claim he has against the plaintiff does
not estop him from asserting such claim in an independent action against the
plaintiff.").
[Vol. 41:41566
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only other mechanisms in Minnesota law by which a litigant's cause
of action is automatically incinerated. As with dismissal under Rule
5.04, no inquiry is made into the merits of the claim. Both Rules
5.04 and 13.01 may have justifications, but the repercussions for
failure to conform are harsh. Involuntary dismissal or estoppel in
such cases would seem contrary to the ordinary reluctance to deny
persons their day in court.
VII. INSTITUTING THE CHANGE: PANIC IN THE OFFICE
A. The Hapless Attorney
It is easy to see how this could get ugly. A veteran Minnesota
attorney commences an action in hip-pocket fashion, per usual. He
knows the rules like the back of his hand and sees no reason to
regularly consult them. For whatever reason-perhaps it has been
difficult to schedule depositions, or the defendant has been
dragging its feet-a year passes and the plaintiff's attorney has not
thought to file the action. One day, the plaintiffs attorney receives
a letter from the defendant: "Pursuant to the newly-amended Rule
5.04, this action is deemed dismissed with prejudice and we will be
closing our file." Without consideration of the merits, the case is
over. The defendant walks away scot-free, and the plaintiff
successfully sues her attorney for malpractice.
B. The Purpose of the Court System
This certainly does not seem to be the portrait of justice. After
all, the ultimate purpose of courts is not to play procedural games.c8
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides that procedural rules
"shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."' The primary goal
is justice-procedural strictures are merely the means of arriving at
this goal.7° It is right to be concerned when a procedural rule
68. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 165, 190 N.W.2d 651,
656 (1971) ("[W]e must . . . be guided by the principle that rules of civil
procedure are designed to effect the settlement of controversies upon their merits
rather than to terminate actions by dismissal on technical grounds.").
69. MINN. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added). "These goals should guide all
aspects of judicial administration . Id. advisory committee comments (1996
amendments).
70. See Love v. Anderson, 240 Minn. 312, 314, 61 N.W.2d 419, 421 (1953)
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appears to put another objective above justice, especially when such
a rule utterly forecloses the possibility of adjudication on the
merits.
C. The Problem with "Deemed Dismissed"
1. Selecting a Means of Enforcement
A rule is toothless if there are no adverse consequences for
failure to conform to it. The Civil Justice Reform Task Force
contemplated a number of alternative mechanisms to enforce the
new one-year filing requirement.7' The proposed consequences for
failure to comply included:
loss of the ability to file non-dispositive motions, dismissal
without prejudice subject to monetary sanctions to
reinstate the case, dismissal without prejudice but filing is
required to reinitiate the case, a rebuttable presumption
of failure to prosecute which requires a motion to dismiss
and court action granting the motion, and dismissal with
prejudice after one year unless parties within that year
sign a stipulation to extend the filing period.
7 2
Initially, the subcommittee handling this area of reform
recommended outright dismissal with prejudice, but a majority of
the task force considered such a penalty to be "too harsh."73 The
final report proposes two alternatives, each of which received a
comparable number of votes from the committee at large.74
Alternative number one, with sixteen out of twenty-one votes, is
dismissal with prejudice unless the involved parties sign a
stipulation.7 5 This is the alternative that was ultimately codified.76
Alternative number two, with fourteen votes, is dismissal without
prejudice but mandatory filing to reinstate.
("The Rules of Civil Procedure provide that they shall be so construed as to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. They reflect a
well-considered policy to discourage technicalities and form.").
71. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 23-24.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. MINN. R. Cmv. P. 5.04.
77. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 23-24.
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Selecting alternative number one would seem inconsistent
with the majority's sentiment that dismissal with prejudice is "too
harsh." To be sure, the chosen penalty is conditioned by a
stipulation exception. However, it is unlikely that a defendant
would voluntarily re-open a case against herself or himself. A
stipulation is a realistic possibility only in situations where two or
more parties to the action want to mobilize the justice system. In
many practice areas, such as personal injury, this is almost never
the case.
David F. Herr, of counsel at Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand
78
and a member of the Civil Justice Reform Task Force, opined that
the supreme court chose dismissal with prejudice, rather than
dismissal without prejudice, to avoid statute-of-limitations
complications that would inevitably arise under the latter option.'9
"The problem with that approach," he noted, "is that it has a sort of
superficial lenity to it. It isn't really without prejudice. It's without
prejudice in some cases. In other cases, the passage of time means
that the case cannot be filed."80 In other words, reinstatement by
filing a case would only work if the applicable statute of limitations
had not already tolled. In cases where the statute of limitations had
tolled, the dismissal would in effect be with prejudice."
2. Procedural and Substantive Requirements for Involuntary
Dismissal
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02 governs involuntary
dismissal8 2 It provides that a court may, upon its own initiative,
dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a
procedural rule or court order."' It is unclear whether this rule
authorizes automatic dismissal-it would be difficult to argue that a
78. The author would like to thank Mr. Herr for taking the time to meet and
for purchasing breakfast. Mr. Herr's professional profile and contact information
may be found at http://www.maslon.com/dherr.
79. Interview with David F. Herr, supra note 65. Specific time limitations for
commencement of actions are set out in MINN. STAT. §§ 541.01-.36 (2014).
80. Interview with David F. Herr, supra note 65.
81. See MINN. STAT. § 541.01 ("Actions can only be commenced within
the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action
accrues. . . "(emphasis added)).
82. MINN. R. Cmv. P. 41.02.
83. Id. R. 41.02(a); see supra Part V.
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court took any initiative when an action is simply deemed dismissed
by rule.
In Firoved v. General Motors Corp., the Minnesota Supreme
Court stressed that involuntary dismissal is drastic and should not
be hastily employed."
An order of dismissal on procedural grounds runs
counter to the primary objective of the law to dispose of
cases on the merits. Since a dismissal with prejudice
operates as an adjudication on the merits, it is the most
punitive sanction which can be imposed for
noncompliance with the rules or order of the court or for
failure to prosecute. It should therefore be granted only
85under exceptional circumstances.
Eleven years later, in Scherer v. Hanson, the supreme court laid
out two prerequisites for involuntary dismissal on the ground of
failure to prosecute: "(1) that the delay prejudiced the defendant,
and (2) that the delay was unreasonable and inexcusable."'8 6
Clearly, no such prerequisite is made with dismissal under Rule
5.04-there are no questions of prejudice or the cause of delay. 7
Rule 5.04 does not inquire into the circumstances surrounding a
delay in filing."'
Historically, Minnesota courts have granted involuntary
dismissal only upon a fact-specific showing of prejudice and
inexcusable delay. In Dvoracek v. Lovely, a widow sued her insurer
for wrongfully urging her now-deceased husband to cancel his life
insurance policies.8 9 The complaint was never filed in district
84. See 277 Minn. 278, 283, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1967).
85. Id.; see MINN. R. CIv. P. 41.02(c) ("Unless the court specifies otherwise in
its order, a dismissal pursuant to this rule and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule or in Rule 41.01 ... operates as an adjudication upon the merits.").
86. 270 N.W.2d 23, 24 (Minn. 1978). In this case, plaintiff Wilfred Scherer
brought an action against defendants Hanson and Richards for damage allegedly
caused to his property when defendants conducted a blasting operation nearby.
Id. Plaintiff did nothing to pursue the action for over seven years. Id. Defendants
moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute, but the court denied this
motion on the grounds that: (1) the delay did not significantly prejudice
defendants, and (2) plaintiffs failure to prosecute was due to the neglect of his
former attorney. Id. at 24-25.
87. MINN. R. Civ. P. 5.04.
88. Id.
89. 366 N.W.2d 391, 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). There were six named
defendants-salesman Richard Lovely, the brokerage firm that employed him, and
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court.9 0 The plaintiff conducted preliminary discovery but quickly
abandoned the pursuit. Seven years passed, during which the
primary defendants' attorney stopped practicing law, and several
material witnesses fell out of contact. A trial court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, finding that
the defendants had "obviously been prejudiced by the seven-year
delay," and the plaintiff had offered no reasonable excuse for the
delay.93 The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by granting the dismissal.94
In Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., a former employee served a
summons and complaint on her former employer alleging
discrimination and sexual harassment. 5 She filed the complaint
over four years later.9 6 The court issued a scheduling order, and the
deadline for discovery passed without the plaintiff requesting any
discovery. 9 The court granted the defendant's "motion to dismiss
for failure to prosecute" when "eight material witnesses had
become unavailable" and the plaintiff had engaged in no
significant discovery for a seven-year period.°s The Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed the defendant had been prejudiced, but
held dismissal was inappropriate because the delay was not
four insurance companies. Id. Lovely was the alleged wrongdoer, and the
remaining defendants were implicated as principals. See id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 393.
92. Id. ("[T]he trial court was provided a letter from former counsel for
Lovely and Consolidated in which he informed counsel for Occidental that he was
no longer practicing law, that there was no listing for Lovely in the telephone
book, and that he had no idea how to reach him.").
93. Id. The trial court acknowledged that Plaintiff had retained a new
attorney two to three years after commencing her action but held that "even a five-
year delay in prosecuting this action is inexcusable." Id.
94. Id. at 394. The court stated that "a trial court has the discretion to dismiss
a suit where the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable diligence is unexcused,
and the nature of the claim requires the exercise of such diligence." Id. at 393-94
(quoting DeMars v. Robinson King Floors, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Minn.
1977)).
95. 656 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Minn. 2003). This "continuous, management-
sanctioned discrimination and sexual harassment" purportedly drove the plaintiff
at one point to attempt suicide. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 393. There was conflicting testimony as to whether the plaintiff had
pursued discovery during this four-year period, but the district court concluded
that she had not. See id. at 397.
98. Id. at 393.
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unreasonable or inexcusable.9 9 The court stated, "A Rule 41.02
dismissal may be improper, even when there has been prejudice, if11 ,100
the delay causing the prejudice was reasonable or excusable.
Both of these cases centered their inquiries on (1) the
prejudice caused to the defendant, and (2) whether the delay was
"unreasonable and inexcusable."'. In fact, this two-factor inquiry is
apparently present in every notable Minnesota case concerning
involuntary dismissal. 0 2 The author has found no pre-2013
Minnesota precedent supporting involuntary dismissal as a matter
of law.
3. Right to Appeal
Automatic dismissal furthermore raises questions of
appealability. Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03
enumerates what a party can appeal.0 3 All ten enumerated items
99. Id. at 395-98. The court reasoned that the delay could be attributed, at
least in part, to the conduct of the defendant: "While it is appropriate for a district
court to consider prefiling delay caused by the nonmoving party, the court should
not consider such delay in isolation. Post-filing activity and any actions on the part
of the moving party that may have contributed to the delay should also be
considered." Id. at 396.
100. Id. at 395. In addition to citing the defendant's role in the delay, the
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the notion that mere failure to pursue
discovery could serve as sufficient grounds for dismissal. Id. at 396-97.
101. Id. at 394 (quoting Scherer v. Hanson, 270 N.W.2d 23, 24 (Minn. 1978));
Dvoracek v. Lovely, 366 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
102. See, e.g., Bonhiver v. Fugelso, Porter, Simich & Whiteman, Inc., 355
N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. 1984); see also Ed H. Anderson Co., v. A.P.I., Inc., 411
N.W.2d 254, 256 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). However, in the latter case the Minnesota
Court of Appeals noted that the movant need not necessarily make a showing of
"particular" prejudice: "Although [movant] has not shown it will suffer particular
prejudice if [plaintiff] is allowed to proceed, the need to search for concrete and
identifiable examples of prejudice diminishes after several years of unnecessary
delay." Ed H. Anderson Co., 411 N.W.2d at 257. This suggests that the marked
presence of one factor (here, inexcusable delay) may make up for the relative
absence of the other factor (here, prejudice).
103. MINN. R. CIv. APp. P. 103.03. A 1983 comment provides, "Review of any
order not specifically enumerated in Rule 103.03 is discretionary only, and
permission to appeal must be sought pursuant to Rule 105." Id. cmt. (1983). An
advisory committee comment, supplementing the 1998 amendments,
contradictorily states, "[T] he Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that there
are certain instances in which an appeal may be allowed as a matter of right even
though the ground for that appeal is not found expressly in the provisions of Rule
103.03." Id. advisory committee cmt. (1998 amendments). Taking the latter
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are "order[s]," 'judgment[s]," or "decision [s]."'' 4 There is no
express provision permitting appeal from something that is not an
order, judgment, or decision.
Automatic dismissal under Rule 5.04 does not involve any
action by the court whatsoever-there is no order, judgment, or
decision effectuating the dismissal." It would therefore seem that,
at least under a plain-text interpretation of the procedural rules,
there is no right to appeal such a dismissal. This is due to the fact
that there is nothing concrete to appeal from.
Granted, this is not the weightiest concern-it is unlikely that
an appellate court would deny jurisdiction or standing because of
this procedural nuance.0 7 To ensure appealability, a plaintiff would
file the action late, prompting the defendant to move to dismiss
under Rule 5.04, and then would seek relief under Minnesota Rule
of Civil Procedure, 60.02(a), 60.02(f), or 86.01(b).
"" If the court
denied such relief, the denial would come in the form of a clearly
appealable judgment.
4. Relief Under Rule 60.02
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 provides for relief
from a judgment in the case of mistake, inadvertence, excusable
comment to supersede the former, there appears to be some wiggle room beyond
the strict letter of the rule.
104. Id. R. 103.03(a)-(j).
105. See id. That said, the accompanying advisory committee comments from
1998 and 2000 and the 1983 comment evidence an increasingly permissive
conception of appeal by right. The comments respond to Minnesota Supreme
Court precedent that tends to favor granting review. See id. advisory committee
cmt. (2000 amendments); id. advisory committee cmt. (1998 amendments); id.
cmt. (1983).
106. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 5.04. In its final report, the Civil Justice Reform Task
Force lists a number of "pros" associated with the sort of dismissal ultimately
codified in Rule 5.04-among them, dismissal with prejudice "[d]oes not require a
motion so less burden on court and staff." RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 23.
This seems to indicate that the task force saw automatic involuntary dismissal as a
beneficial, resource-saving mode of "adjudicating" matters.
107. Because the amendment to Rule 5.04 is so new, there is little case law
interpreting and applying it. It remains to be seen how the Minnesota Court of
Appeals will respond to an appeal of this sort. The above statement is based not on
specific case law, but rather on an optimistic view of the court of appeals as a body
concerned more with justice than technical rigidity.
108. MINN. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (a), (f), 86.01 (b); see infra Part VII.C.4-5.
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neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, and so on.' 9 Relevant
here are the so-dubbed "Finden factors" for application of the rule
in cases of attorney neglect:
[I]t is a cardinal rule that, in keeping with the spirit of
Rule 60.02, in furtherance of justice, and pursuant to a
liberal policy conducive to the trial of causes on their
merits, the court should relieve a defendant from the
consequences of his attorney's neglect in those cases
where defendant "(a) is possessed of a reasonable defense
on the merits, (b) has a reasonable excuse for his failure
or neglect to answer, (c) has acted with due diligence
after notice of the entry of judgment, and (d) [shows]
that no substantial prejudice will result to the other
party.""
0
In Finden, a young man and his father sued the defendant for
allegedly assaulting the former."' The defendant hired an attorney,
who assured him that he would handle the matter.12 Contrary to
this assurance, the attorney never answered the complaint and
stopped responding to communications from adverse counsel. 13
The trial court entered a defaultjudgment for the plaintiffs."
4
109. MINN. R. CIr. P. 60.02. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or the party's legal representatives from a final judgment ...
order, or proceeding and may order a new trial or grant such other
relief as may bejust for the following reasons:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
Id.
110. Finden v. Klaas, 268 Minn. 268, 271, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (1964)
(quoting Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d
454, 456 (1952)).
111. Id. at 268, 128 N.W.2d at 749. At the time of the alleged incident,
plaintiff Dennis Finden was nineteen years old. Id. Defendant Klaas maintained
that he had acted in self-defense. Id. at 271, 128 N.W.2d at 750.
112. Id. at 268, 128 N.W.2d at 749 ("Defendant relied upon his attorney's
assurance that he was making progress with the investigation and that an answer
had been filed.").
113. Id. Several phone conferences and other correspondences were had
between counsel, but the defendant's attorney inexplicably never filed an answer.
Id. More than four months after commencement, the plaintiff notified defense
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Following notice of judgment, the defendant filed a "motion
to vacate the judgment and for leave to answer."' The trial court
denied this motion on the ground that the defendant's neglect was
not excusable."' On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed and remanded. 1 The court found that granting the
motion would not have substantially prejudiced the plaintiffs, and
that the defendant had acted with "reasonable diligence" upon
notice ofjudgment.""
It would seem that many cases pending as of July 1, 2013, and
involuntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 5.04, could meet the
Finden factors and thus be resuscitated under Rule 60.02. Writing
for Bench and Bar of Minnesota, David F. Herr and the Honorable
Louise Bjorkman discuss Rule 60.02 as applied to dismissals under
Rule 5.04.19 Notably, Judge Bjorkman served as chair of the Civil
Justice Reform Task Force and Mr. Herr was a member. 2 0 They
surmise that Rule 60.02 may afford relief from dismissals under
Rule 5.04, but follow this with a dubious cautionary note: "Counsel
should not rely on this life-ring, however-Rule 60 allows for relief
counsel in writing of a scheduled default hearing. Id. There was no reply. Id. at
268, 128 N.W.2d at 749-50.
114. Id. at 270, 128 N.W.2d at 750. The court awarded $30,000 to Dennis
Finden and an additional $3048.09 to his father. Id. Adjusted for inflation, that
amounts to over a quarter of a million dollars. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 23,
2015).
115. Finden, 268 Minn. at 270, 128 N.W.2d at 750. Prior to this, the plaintiffs
had made two attempts to execute the judgment. Id. The defendant claimed that
he had no knowledge of his attorney's failure to perform until the plaintiffs' first
attempt to levy execution. Id.
116. Id. The holding of inexcusability was supported by the fact that the
defendant received written notice of the plaintiffs' intent to apply for a default
judgment. Id. at 269, 128 N.W.2d at 749.
117. Id. at 273, 128 N.W.2d at 751.
118. Id. at 272, 128 N.W.2d at 751 ("In plaintiffs' opposing affidavit, [no]
prejudice was claimed except delay and the added expense incurred by reason of
the default proceedings.").
119. Bjorkman & Herr, supra note 49, at 28:
Rule 60 might be available to allow relief from the dismissal if the
criteria of Rule 60 could be met. The most likely basis under Rule 60
would be "excusable neglect," and the parties seeking to proceed with
the case would need to establish both neglect (relatively easy to do)
and excuse (perhaps not as easily established).
Id.
120. Order Establishing CivilJustice Reform Task Force, supra note 48.
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from an 'order orjudgment,' neither of which would arguably exist
for a dismissal by operation of Rule 5.04.
12
1
It is certainly worrying that members of the Task Force
themselves do not know how the amended Rule 5.04 interacts with
other rules. 122 It is apparently left to judges to construct Rule 60.02
as they see fit, at least in the context of dismissal under Rule 5.04.121
This is similar to the above-discussed question of appealability-
how can one appeal a judgment or be relieved of a judgment when
there is no judgment?
When asked whether he thought Rule 60.02 will prove a life-
ring for blindsided litigants, Mr. Herr responded, "The court of
appeals or the supreme court will have to decide this. Personally, I
think Rule 60.02 should apply, but counsel will have to show
excusable neglect. There may be a change coming to clarify that
Rule 60 applies or to amend Rule 60.
'
,124
Thus, practitioners need only wait for this issue to reach the
appellate level.125 Until then, litigants relying on Rule 60.02 are at
the mercy of district court judges.
5. Relief Under Rule 86. 01 (b)
Alternatively, an attorney finding his or her case involuntarily
dismissed under Rule 5.04 may attempt to invoke Minnesota Rule
121. Bjorkman & Herr, supra note 49, at 28.
122. While this may be a deliberate showing of deference to district court
judges, it would seem to invite inconsistency between courts.
123. By way of footnote in its final report, the Task Force confusingly states,
"Minn. R. Civ. P. 60 allows parties to seek relief from a dismissal order."
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 23 n.9. This is apparently intended to suggest
that Rule 60 would be available, but, again, in these cases there is no "dismissal
order" from which to seek relief.
124. Interview with David F. Herr, supra note 65 (quotation paraphrased).
125. Any practitioner embarking to appeal a Rule 5.04 dismissal should note
that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure were likewise amended
effective July 1, 2014. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure, ADM09-8006 (Minn. Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www
.mncourts.gov/Documents/O/Public/ClerksOffice/Rule%20Amendments/2014
-02-28%200rder%2OCiv%2OApp%2OProc%2OAmendments.pdf.
126. There is a possibility for considerable variation in light of the fact that
Minnesota currently seats 289 district court judges. District Courts, MINN. JUD.
BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/O/Public/Court Information
_Office/Informational%2OBrochures/QF-_DistrictCourts.pdf (last visited Apr.
23, 2015).
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of Civil Procedure 86.01(b) .2' This rule specifically addresses
application of new amendments to pending actions, and mercifully
empowers courts to exercise discretion:
Unless otherwise specified by the court, all amendments
will take effect on either January 1 or July 1 in the year of
or the year following their adoption. They govern all
proceedings in actions brought after they take effect, and
also all further proceedings in actions then pending,
except as to the extent that in the opinion of the court their
application in a particular action pending when the amendments
128
take effect would not befeasible, or would work injustice ....
The above-emphasized language evinces a clear intention on
the part of the Minnesota Supreme Court that justice not be
compromised for the sake of procedure. The major case
discussing this rule is Larson v. Independent School District No. 314.30
This case arose after a 1975 amendment to Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 26.02 that substantially expanded the scope of
discovery.13 1 Considering whether the amended rule should apply
to materials created prior to the effective date, the court focused
on intent and policy: "In construing a rule the sole object of
inquiry is the intent of this court at the time of promulgation."
3 2
The court continued:
127. MINN. R. Civ. P. 86.01(b). The relevant provision of this rule. is
substantively identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 86(a) (2) (B).
128. MINN. R. Civ. P. 86.01 (b) (emphasis added).
129. See Preston v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 10, 12 (7th Cir. 1949) ("The
purpose of the exception in [FRCP] 86 in the original rules was to prevent
injustice during the transition period from the old procedure to the then new
procedure. .. ").
130. Larson v. Indep. School Dist. No. 314, 305 Minn. 358, 233 N.W.2d 744
(1975). Aside from this case, there is hardly any commentary on the rule.
131. Id. at 360, 233 N.W.2d at 746. Rule 26.02 was amended in conjunction
with Rule 34.01, the latter of which was amended in the same year to eliminate the
requirement of a showing of "good cause" to obtain unprivileged documents in
discovery. MINN. R. CIv. P. 34.01 advisory committee note (1973). Rule 26.02(b),
which previously "wholly immunized written work product of a party's counsel
from discovery," was modified to permit discovery of such work product upon a
showing of "substantial need" and "undue hardship" in obtaining the information
by other means. Larson, 305 Minn. at 360, 233 N.W.2d at 746; see MINN. R. Civ. P.
26.02(b) advisory committee note, subdiv. (3) (1975).
132. Larson, 305 Minn. at 361, 233 N.W.2d at 747.
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Rule 1, Rules of Civil Procedure, enjoins us to construe
the rules so as "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." In accordance with this
principle we have held that the rules are to be liberally
construed so as to serve the interests ofjustice and so as to
discourage reliance on technicalities and form.1
3
The question was thus not to be answered through textual
construction or blind application but, rather, through principled
considerations of fairness and justice. A proper ruling required
inquiry into the factual circumstances of the individual case.
Applying these considerations to the present matter, the
decisive factor should be the underlying purpose of the new one-
year filing requirement. Courts should be mindful of this purpose
and should moreover ensure that a decision to grant or deny relief
comports with the ideal of 'just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.""'
In its final report, the Civil Justice Reform Task Force
explained its reasoning behind recommending the filing
requirement.3 5 The Task Force began by acknowledging that
Minnesota's hip-pocket regime is anomalous, but declined to
recommend commencement-by-filing on the ground that such a
change would cause "unwarranted" confusion and require too
much energy.1 6 So reasons the Task Force, a one-year filing
requirement preserves many of the advantages of the hip-pocket
system while limiting its drawbacks. 1
3 7
Among other things, the requirement combats the evils of
unreasonable delay: "When cases eventually come into court many
years after service, everything is harder to accomplish at that point.
Time is not a friend to litigation. It increases burdens for all• , 138
participants. The task force furthermore reasoned that such a
133. Id. at 362, 233 N.W.2d at 747 (citing Indep. School Dist. No. 273 v. Gross,
291 Minn. 158, 190 N.W.2d 651 (1971); Love v. Anderson, 240 Minn. 312, 61
N.W.2d 419 (1953)).
134. MINN. R. Crv. P. 1.
135. REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 21-24.
136. Id. at 21 ("Many task force members believe it is not necessary to change
the rule on commencement of actions, and that the confusion it would entail and
the energy it would require to make this change is not warranted. The fact is that
any party can file with the court at any time . ").
137. Id. at 22.
138. Id.
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requirement would "help the court to know what cases are out
there, and increase filing fee revenue.",139
Thus, three primary reasons seem to undergird the Task
Force's recommendation: (1) controlling the problems associated
with excessive delay in filing; (2) putting cases on public radar; and
(3) generating revenue. The question is whether granting relief
under Rule 86.01(b) (or 60.02, for that matter) subverts any of
these objectives.
An answer may be quickly rendered with respect to the latter
two objectives. Of course, denying relief from involuntary dismissal
under Rule 5.04 does nothing to help courts "know what cases are
out there" or increase filing-fee revenue.' As for the first
objective-preventing excessive delay-denying relief in a given
case presumably accomplishes this by compelling attorneys to
follow the rule in the future. Aware of the harsh consequences of
failing to file within one year, attorneys will quickly straighten their
act.
However, this reasoning is problematic. In the case of the
"hapless attorney" who unwittingly violated the new requirement,
this violation may well have been the product of understandable
delay or excusable neglect. Granting relief in such cases does little
to subvert the objective of having attorneys conform to the rule in
the future. Once apprised of the filing requirement, attorneys will
abide by it as a matter of course. Involuntary dismissal with no
opportunity for relief, especially with respect to cases caught in the
wake of the new amendment, would seem unnecessarily harsh.
Having conducted this analysis, it appears that an opportunity
for relief under Rules 60.02 or 86.01 (b) would not undermine the
purposes of the new one-year filing requirement. There is no
principled reason for withholding this opportunity as a matter of
law.
6. Constitutional Implications
In Mr. Herr's words, "The group that earns no sympathy from
the committee, unfortunately, is those people who weren't paying
attention to the fact that the year was running.'. After all, the
profession of law comes with the highest of standards. Lawyers must
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Interview with David F. Herr, supra note 65.
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be held accountable for their own incompetence. Minnesota
attorneys have had plenty of advanced warning as to the new filing
requirement, and it is not the courts' problem that some attorneys
caught on too late. But is the punishment misplaced?
Automatic involuntary dismissal under Rule 5.04 may panic a
blindsided plaintiffs attorney, but the real injustice is visited upon
the client. Granted, the client may prevail on an action for attorney
malpractice; notwithstanding, Rule 5.04 punishes an attorney's
oversight by denying the client legal redress. This raises important
constitutional questions.
Article I, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution provides:
"Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or
character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase,
completely and without denial, promptly and without delay,
conformable to the laws."'' 42 This is closely tied to section 4 of article
I, which begins, "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,
and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in
controversy.'
4 3
These sections are not without commentary. In 1980, the
Minnesota Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of parental
immunity."' The court cited article I, section 8 to the effect that
children have a constitutional right to recover against their parents:
"A fundamental concept of our legal system and a right guaranteed
by our state constitution, is that a remedy be afforded to those who
have been injured due to the conduct of another."'""
In the 1964 case, Landgraf v. Ellsworth, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reaffirmed a party's constitutional right to trial by jury:
"Where a party has a constitutional right to a jury trial, denial of
the right is reversible error."' 6 The district court judge ruled from
the bench on the plaintiff's action against his former employer.1
47
142. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
143. Id. § 4.
144. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (adopting the
"reasonable parent standard" outlined by the California Supreme Court in Gibson
v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971)).
145. Id. at 600. The court cited its 1975 decision in Nieting v. Blondell, 306
Minn. 122, 132, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (1975), whereby it abolished tort immunity
for the State of Minnesota. Anderson, 295 N.W.2d at 600.
146. Landgrafv. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 326, 126 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1964).
147. Id. The plaintiff served as general manager at the defendant's restaurant
supply company and received a healthy commission for his sales. Id. at 325, 126
1580 [Vol. 41:4
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The plaintiff appealed, and the supreme court reversed on the
ground that the plaintiff was unjustly deprived of his right to a jury
trial. 4
Of course, neither of these cases is a mirror of the matter at
hand. Neither case involved attorney misconduct precluding a
plaintiff's otherwise actionable claim. Nonetheless, these cases
stand for the principle that redress at law-in the hands of ajury-
is a fundamental constitutional guarantee. As with any
constitutional guarantee, this right is not to be taken lightly. Even if
automatic involuntary dismissal under Rule 5.04 does not outright
violate this guarantee, it at least contravenes the spirit of these
constitutional provisions.
VIII. LOOKING FORWARD: THE PROPRIETY OF THE MIDDLE ROAD
A. The CivilJustice Reform Campaign: National Context
Minnesota is not alone in its efforts to improve the civil justice
system. In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court established a Supreme'49
Court Task Force for Civil Justice Reform. Its charge was
to explore contemporary discovery practices, ADR, litigation
management, court rules, and pretrial procedures, and to
recommend changes aimed at fostering a system "faster, less
complex, more affordable, and better equipped to handle complex
cases." 5 0 This task force tendered its report on January 30, 2012.'
5'
The report contains numerous proposals, among them: discovery
reform, certain dates for trial, and a pilot program "based on a two-
tier civil justice system."'
' 52
N.W.2d at 768. The plaintiff brought this action for outstanding commissions
allegedly still owed to him after quitting. Id., 126 N.W.2d at 767.
148. Id. at 330-31, 126 N.W.2d at 770. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the plaintiff's action was "purely equitable" and thus properly
adjudicated from the bench. Id. at 328, 126 N.W.2d at 769.
149. Iowa: Implementing Recommendations of Supreme Court Task Force for Civil
Justice Reform, INST. FOR ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL Sys., http://iaals.du.edu/library
/publications/iowa-impleme n ting-recomme ndations-of-supreme-court-task-force
-for-civil-jus (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
150. Id.
151. IOWA CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, REFORMING THE IOWA CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2012), available at http://www.iowacourtsonline.org/wfdata/files
/Committees/CivilJusticeReform/FINAL03_22 12.pdf.
152. Id. at v-vi. This program would place lower-value cases on an expedited
litigation track characterized by, among other things, "streamlined or limited
158120151
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The Honorable Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, Commercial Division, recently established a
Task Force on Commercial Litigation in the 21st Century. 5' This
body's charge was to develop proposals aimed at "ensur[ing] that
the New York Judiciary helps [its] State retain its role as the
preeminent financial and commercial center of the world."'154 The
Task Force tendered its report in June 2012. 155 The proposals
encompass docket management, procedural reform, 'judicial
support and engagement," and ADR.
Perhaps most reminiscent of Minnesota's undertaking is
Utah's initiative to reform its rules of civil procedure. In 2010, the
Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil
Procedure, dissatisfied with the increasing cost of civil discovery
and the delay attributable to it, proposed substantial changes
to Utah's rules."' Among the proposed changes was the
implementation of a two-tiered discovery system calling for
"extraordinary discovery" in appropriate cases, an increased
breadth of mandatory initial disclosures, and restrictions limiting
deposition of expert witnesses. 
1
s
Like Minnesota, Utah sought to advance the mandate of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 (in its respective state
equivalent)-that is, "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
discovery processes; limited motion practice; simplified rules of evidence;
accelerated pre-trial deadlines and earlier trial dates; [and] possible mandatory
ADR." Id. at 14. Per the recommendations of the Minnesota Civil Justice Reform
Task Force, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently instituted an "Expedited
Litigation Track" pilot program of its own. See Final Order, supra note 58.
153. THE CHIEF JUDGE'S TASK FORCE ON COMMERCIAL LITIG. IN THE 21sT
CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEFJUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 5 (2012), available at https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/PDFs/Chief
JudgesTaskForceOnCommercialLitigationInThe2 lstpdf.pdf.
154. Id. at 1.
155. Id. at 6.
156. Id. at 2. The task force recommended early assignment of cases to judges,
on the ground that "early and continued judicial involvement [would] assist in
streamlining discovery by facilitating prompt resolution of disputes and
monitoring compliance with discovery obligations." Id. at 15.
157. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING CIVIL DISCOVERY (2010) [hereinafter
UTAH PROPOSED RULES], available at http://www.utcourts.gov/committees/civproc
/Proposed_RulesGoverningDiscoveryClean.pdf.
158. Id. at 3-29.
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determination of every action."'5' The Committee cited several
empirical studies, together suggesting that delay and expense
associated with civil discovery is a national problem.' The
Committee voiced skepticism over whether Utah's conformity with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was appropriate, given the
differences between typical state and federal cases. Utah's
Supreme Court approved the amendments in August 2011, and
they became effective November 1 of that same year.
Additionally, state courts in Colorado, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, federal courts in Pennsylvania and New York, and the
federal district courts in the Seventh Circuit have approved various
pilot projects in pursuit of civil justice reform. 16 Numerous states-
including California, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Texas, and
159. FED. R. CIv. P. 1; UTAH PROPOSED RULES, supra note 157, at 1.
160. UTAH PROPOSED RULES, supra note 157, at 1 ("More than 80% of the
respondents in the ACTL, ABA, and NELA surveys said that they or their firms
turned down cases because the amount at issue did not justify the expense. The
most commonly cited amount-in-controversy threshold, below which a case cannot
be economically handled, was $100,000."); see THE AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & THE INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
Sys., FINAL REPORT 1 (2009), available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam
/documents/publications/ACTL-IAALS FinalReport rev_8-10.pdf ("The proj-
ect was conceived as an outgrowth of increasing concerns that problems in the
civil justice system, especially those relating to discovery, have resulted in
unacceptable delays and prohibitive expense.").
161. UTAH PROPOSED RULES, supra note 157, at 1.
[D]uring the past 30 years or more, the Utah Rules have evolved to be
increasingly consistent with the federal rules and their amendments. It
was perceived that consistency with the federal rules, along with the
extensive case-law interpreting them, would provide a positive benefit.
The federal discovery rules are now being seriously questioned as well,
but the committee has come to question the very premise upon which
Utah adopted those rules. The federal rules were designed for complex
cases with large amounts in controversy that typify the federal system.
The vast majority of cases filed in Utah courts are not those types of
cases. As a result, our state civil justice system has become unavailable
to many people because they cannot afford it.
Id.
162. Marc Therrien, Note, Talkin' 'Bout a Revolution?: Utah Overhauls Its Rules of
Civil Discovety, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 669, 670 (2011).
163. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., RULE ONE INITIATIVE:
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM PROJECTS 1 (2014) [hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
PROJECTS], available at http://law.ku.edu/sites/law.dnipal.ku.edu/files/docs/law
_review/symposium/Panel_2_justiceKourlisOutline.pdf.
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Utah-and federal jurisdictions have considered implementing
expedited trial programs or have undertaken to improve such
programs that already exist. 164
The moral of the story is that, ostensibly, the whole nation is
dissatisfied with civil procedure as it stands today. Evidenced by the
above examples, the common complaint seems to be one of
excessive cost and delay.
B. A Case Study: New York's Transition to Commencement-by-Filing
Minnesota's new filing requirement should be evaluated in the
context of a much broader national movement intended to
enhance the accessibility and efficacy of the civil justice system. The
task at hand is to predict-and ultimately observe-whether this
particular change will advance the broad objectives of this
movement. Fortunately, this sort of change is not without
precedent. Examining the petri dishes that are individual states is
informative of the effects of such a change, as well as of possible
alternatives.
As the birthplace of the Field Code and a state that recently
transitioned from commencement-by-service to commencement-by-
filing, New York would seem to be a particularly suitable petri dish.
Minnesota may not have outright adopted commencement-by-
filing, but studying the transition in New York will nonetheless help
us understand the effects of forcing suits into court.
Prior to July 1, 1992, all civil actions in New York were
commenced by service of a summons. This commencement
action changed on the above-stated date, when section 304 of the
New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules was amended to make
filing-rather than service-the triggering event.' However, New
York's civil, district, and city courts were excluded from this
change. Section 304 instituted commencement-by-filing in the
supreme and county courts, but these lower courts continued to
mark commencement with service of a summons. 167 It was not until
164. Id. at 2-3.
165. See David D. Siegel, Basic Change in Practice in Civil, District, and City Courts:
"Filing" System Adopted; Summons Service No Longer Deemed "Commencement," 164
SIEGEL'S PRAc. REv. 1 (2005); seeAct of June 23, 1992, ch. 216, §§ 3, 27, 1992 N.Y.
Laws 2781, 2783, 2790.
166. Ch. 216, §§ 3, 27, 1992 N.Y. Laws at 2783, 2790.
167. Siegel, supra note 165.
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September 8, 2005, that New York's civil, district, and city lower
courts made the switch.f'8
The primary impetus for the initial 1992 conversion was an
uninspiring one-money.'69 Under the amended section 304, a
party bringing suit has no choice but to pay a filing fee up front.'
70
This requirement eliminates the possibility that a litigant could
bring suit, then settle the case outside of the courthouse walls
without generating any court revenue.
Unsurprisingly, court filing fee revenue did increase. The
change dislodged an additional $10 million dollars from the
pockets of litigants in the first year alone-and precipitated a
twenty percent increase in court filings.'
17
However, not everyone is convinced that revenue hunger was
the primary motivation for the change. In an article addressing the
switch, distinguished New York attorney Paul Aloe writes,
"Although widely cited as a revenue generating measure, its
principal purpose was not to raise revenue, but rather to 'eliminate
many of the pitfalls and traps that attend the commencement of an
action in New York, particularly when the expiration of the statute
of limitations is near." ' . He continues, "[Clourts dealing with
commencement-by-filing in the lower courts would do well to keep
in mind that the system is designed not for fee collection, but to
avoid the fatal dismissal of lawsuits for purely technical defects. ' '
Aloe would thus seem to cast the measures in a much more
aspirational light-not as a gold-mining operation but, rather, an
earnest attempt to see that procedure take a back seat to justice.
Debt collectors in New York were particularly troubled by the
change. In fact, it was the lobbyists with the Collection Bar who
initially prevented commencement-by-filing from reaching New
168. Id.
169. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2015, chapters 1 to 13,
50 to 54, 61); Fryv. Tarrytown, 680 N.E.2d 578, 580 (N.Y. 1997).
170. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304 (Westlaw).
171. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 21 n.8 ("Collection firms estimate
that they currently have 50,000 non-filed consumer cases that have accumulated
over the past several years, and that there are approximately twice as many non-
filed consumer cases as there are filed consumer cases.").
172. Paul H. Aloe, Civil Practice, 56 SYRACUSE L. REv. 527, 529 (2006) (footnote
omitted) (quoting James N. Blair & Paul H. Aloe, New Commencement by Filing Law:
A Practitioner's Survival Guide, N.Y. L.J.,June 26, 1992, at 1).
173. Id. at 534.
15852015]
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York's lower courts. 7 4 Lobbyists argued that, of the many actions
brought against consumer debtors, many were resolved long before
judicial intervention was actually needed.7 5 The reasoning of this
argument is that filing fees in these cases are not only uncalled for,
but may also add to the mounting heap of a debtor's obligations."'
This argument evidently held weight, but eventually gave way to
countervailing interests as lower courts made the switch in 
2005.177
Whatever the motivations behind New York's adoption of
commencement-by-filing, three things are clear: (1) it replenished
state coffers, (2) it put more cases on the court's radar, and (3) it
did not make everyone happy.
C. Too Much? Not Enough? Both? Neither?
Having indulged in the national context of civil justice reform
and trained a looking glass at New York, what remains is to
consider the new Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5.04 from a
simultaneously narrow and broad vantage point. Is the measure
neatly tailored to its purposes? If so, are these purposes advisable?
Are there any alternatives that would better serve these purposes?
The one-year filing requirement puts Minnesota in an awkward
position, if not functionally, then at least socially. Minnesota is one
of only three states that have not converted to commencement-by-
filing (or permitted commencement-by-service but required service
shortly thereafter). " Of Minnesota's two compatriots, North
Dakota and South Dakota, neither has promulgated a rule like
5.04. Minnesota thus walks a lonely road-a middle road between
traditional hip-pocketry and new-age commencement-by-filing.
174. Id. at 529-30.
175. Id. at 530.
176. REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 22. This is addressed in the final
report of the Minnesota Task Force:
The task force heard from consumer collection attorneys representing
creditors who indicated that waiting for consumers to get back on their
feet is the most common reason for waiting to file, that it is
advantageous for consumers to not have the debt appear on the court
record, and filing fees and attorney will only add to a consumer's debt
burden.
Id.
177. Aloe, supra note 172, at 528.
178. See supra Part II.
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There's nothing per se wrong about a lonely middle road, but it
would be helpful to evaluate this road in light of alternatives.
1. Efficacy
The new one-year filing requirement's potential impact on the
civil justice system must be evaluated. As stated earlier, the Task
Force identified three major goals behind imposing the filing
deadline: (1) controlling the problems associated with excessive
delay in filing, (2) putting cases on public radar, and (3)
generating revenue.
The first of these three goals seems founded on the conviction
that judicial supervision is an effective check on inefficient and
needlessly cosdy pre-trial practices. As stated in the Task Force's
final report, "[M]any task force members believe that cases can
only be effectively managed when a judge is assigned to the case,
and that managing cases in a way that is effective for courts and
parties makes a difference in reducing cost and delay."' s Mr. Herr
seems to share this skepticism of the ability of attorneys to handle
cases themselves: "Even lawyers cannot be reliably relied on to push
cases forward, even when it's in their clients' interests to do so. The
courts shouldn't abdicate responsibility for getting cases decided in
a reasonable timeframe."''
As for goals two and three, there is no doubt that each will be
exacted, at least to some degree. More cases will be filed, and more
filing-fee revenue will be generated. But is the Minnesota justice
system prepared for a fresh onslaught of new civil cases, in light of
its "already crowded dockets?"' 2
At the end of the day, "any party to an action may file with the
court at any time.' 8' Doing so puts the case on public radar, draws
179. See supra Part VII.C.5.
180. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 21.
181. Interview with David F. Herr, supra note 65.
182. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 21.
183. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 21; In Minnesota, June 2014 Is:
"File Your Hip Pocket Service Cases Month," MKT LAW (June 2, 2014), http://mktlaw
blog.com/2014/06/02/in-mi nnesotajune-2014-is-file-your-h ip-pocket-service-cases
-month/ [hereinafter MKT LAw] ("Not filing can be beneficial in settling cases
early with less expense. Sometimes it can be abused by a plaintiff with a weak case
looking for a nuisance value settlement. But still not without a counterbalance: A
defendant can file the case at anytime too.. [sic] As defense counsel, I've filed first
many times to call a plaintiff's apparent bluff.").
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a filing fee, and places ajudge in a supervisory role.84 If all involved
parties elect to postpone filing during the pleading stages and
discovery, one of two things may happen: (1) the parties, informed
by discovery and correspondences, settle without any need for
court intervention; or (2) a party brings a motion that requires the
attention of a judge."5 In the former instance, the justice system
builds no revenue, but it also does not spend its limited resources
on a matter that will ultimately resolve itself. In the second
instance, the justice system intervenes only when it has an essential
task to perform.
If the one-year filing requirement, among the many other
changes proposed by the Civil Justice Reform Task Force, truly is
"designed to bring the legal community back to the court
system,"'' 6 the court system ought to make sure that it can handle
the demands of this legal community. The Task Force itself
acknowledges that there are "insufficient judicial resources for civil
cases." 18 7 Would it make sense, then, to allocate precious judicial
resources to matters in which none of the involved parties want (or
need) court involvement?
2. Why Not Go With the Flow?
Rather than adding an anomalous constraint to an antiquated
system, one might ask why Minnesota doesn't simply fall in line
184. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 21.
185. See supra Parts II, V. While a bare complaint need not command the
attention of a judge, motions call for judicial decision making and thus invariably
necessitate filing.
186. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 5.
187. Id. at 7; see NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A CASE STUDY: REENGINEERING
MINNESOTA'S COURTS (2012), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0
/Public/CourtInformationOffice/MNCaseStudyFinalReport.pdf.
Beginning in 2008 and extending well into the next decade, Minnesota
will see a 30% jump in workers reaching the average retirement age of
62. Seniors over the age of 65 will exceed the number of school age
children. The cost for government-funded social security, medical care,
and public employee pensions will put unprecedented financial
pressures on local, state, and federal governments. These pressures will
shift government spending priorities to issues of aging and health and
away from other state services, including the courts. Thus, even in
relatively strong economic times, the courts will face greater
competition for tax dollars.
[Vol. 41:41588
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with the vast majority of states and adopt commencement-by-filing?
The Civil Justice Reform Task Force considered proposing this, but
rejected it on a number of grounds. First of all, an outright switch
to commencement-by-filing would require more energy, and would
entail considerably more confusion, than mere implementation of
a one-year filing requirement.188
Second, adopting the federal practice would mean foregoing
many of the benefits of hip-pocket filing. Under Minnesota's
current system, parties may serve, conduct discovery, and settle
before the one-year mark without incurring any filing fees
whatsoever. On the contrary, commencement-by-filing would force
litigants to pay filing fees up front, and it would be immaterial if
the matter settled the very next day. Another benefit of hip-pocket
filing that would be lost is confidentiality. Many litigants are
interested in keeping their matters "out of the public eye."'
89 Filing
with the court creates a public record of the litigants' dispute, and
many wish to avoid creating such a record until absolutely
191)
necessary.
Not to mention, commencement-by-filing would strain
Minnesota's limited judicial resources even further than the one-
year filing requirement. The Civil Justice Reform Task Force was all
too aware of this: "[A] n argument could be made that the potential
impact of eliminating hip-pocket filing mi~ht be somewhere
between a 20% and 100% 
civil filing increase."
IX. CONCLUSION
Setting aside-for a moment-the troubling nature of
automatic involuntary dismissal, Minnesota's lonely middle road
may reveal itself to be the high road. Holding fast to the historic
practice of hip-pocket service, but constraining it with a one-year
filing requirement, preserves the benefits of the hip-pocket regime
while simultaneously guarding against abuses.
Notwithstanding the desirability of such a system, it is hard to
ignore the fact that the federal mode of commencement has
engulfed the vast majority of states. Mr. Herr, when asked if he ever
188. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 21.
189. Id.
190. MKT LAw, supra note 183.
191. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 21 n.8.
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thought that Minnesota would succumb to this peer pressure,
stated:
I would be hard-pressed to make that prediction. Every
time we look at it, there is a tremendous resistance within
the Minnesota bar. Lawyers like the ability to have cases
served, and not filed. And there are a whole host of
reasons. One is just general confidentiality. If it's filed, the
papers become public record-accessible to the media,
accessible to snoopy neighbors, etc.19'
When asked whether he thought the present rule-
commencement-by-service but with a one-year filing requirement-
was sustainable for the long-term or merely a stepping-stone to
some other future procedural standard, Mr. Herr replied, quite
succinctly, "It won't be a problem once people get used to it. Yes, I
don't think this will change.'
9 3
192. Interview with David F. Herr, supra note 65.
193. Id.
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